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Summary
Responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell
to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).  Established
in early 2003, ORHA was headed by Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army
(ret.).  By June 2003, ORHA had been replaced, or subsumed, by the Coalition
Provisional Authority (CPA), which is led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III.
It is unclear whether CPA is a federal agency.  Competing, though not
necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations for how it was established contribute to
the uncertainty about its status. The lack of an authoritative and unambiguous
statement about how this organization was established, by whom, and under what
authority leaves open many questions, particularly in the areas of oversight and
accountability.  Some executive branch documents support the notion that it was
created by the President, possibly as the result of a National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD).  (This document, if it exists, has not been made available to the
public.)  The other possibility is that the authority was created by, or pursuant to,
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003). 
Given that its organizational status is uncertain, an examination of selected
features of CPA might be instructive in assessing what type of organization it is. The
authority is closely aligned with the Department of Defense (DOD): the Under
Secretary of Defense has designated the Secretary of the Army as executive agent for
CPA. Other significant features of the authority include its Office of Inspector
General (OIG), which is expected to work closely with the DOD and U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID) Offices of Inspector General; the extent of
its procurement activities; its regulatory authority; and its Program Review Board.
CPA already has been the subject of several protests related to contracts it awarded,
and, although the resolution of these protests has not shed any light on CPA’s status,
this area of procurement can be instructive.  An undated organization chart provides
some insight into the structure of the authority, although it does not include some key
offices and positions, such as the Deputy Administrator, the OIG, and the legislative
affairs staff.  Provisions in several statutes include reporting requirements that bear
directly or indirectly on CPA.  These include Sections 2202(b), 2203, 2207, and 3001
of P.L. 108-106 (117 Stat. 1209), and Section 1203 of P.L. 108-136 (117 Stat. 1392).
S. 2127, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of
2004, is pending in the 108th Congress.  If enacted, it would establish an Office of
International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the Department of State, which
would be responsible for, among other things, monitoring unstable situations around
the world, planning for reconstruction crises, and coordinating with relevant
executive agencies to develop interagency contingency plans.  This report will be
updated as events warrant.
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Introduction
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA or “the authority”) was established
approximately one month after United States and coalition forces took control of
Baghdad in Iraq on April 9, 2003.1  The authority’s mission is “to restore conditions
of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely
determine their own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and
establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and facilitating
economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.”2  Information
provided on the CPA website indicates that “[t]he Governing Council and the
Coalition Provisional Authority will be dissolved” by June 30, 2004, and that “[t]his
will end the responsibilities of the Coalition as an occupying power as specified in
the United Nations resolutions.”3  
After examining the origin of CPA, this report discusses two views on how the
authority was established, reviews selected characteristics of the authority, identifies
statutory reporting requirements concerning the authority and the reconstruction of
Iraq, and explores several policy issues.
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
Responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance and aiding in the
reconstruction of postwar Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).  Reportedly, the ORHA was established by, or
pursuant to, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, which was issued
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in January 2003.4  NPSD 24 has not been released to the public.  A news article
stated that ORHA was tied to the Pentagon and that, while the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) would handle much of the humanitarian and
reconstruction work, ORHA would control the funding.5  As early as February 12, it
was reported that Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army (ret.), had been
selected to serve as the coordinator for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance,
and that he would report to General Tommy R. Franks, then-commander of U.S.
Central Command.6  
As late as mid-April, it appeared that Lieutenant General Garner was still in
charge of the ORHA.7  However, a news report dated May 2 stated that President
George W. Bush  planned to name Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as special envoy
and civil administrator of Iraq, and that Lieutenant General Garner would report to
Ambassador Bremer.8  On May 6, 2003, President Bush announced that he had
appointed Ambassador Bremer as Presidential Envoy and that he would serve as the
senior leader of the coalition.  (Unlike his appointment as an ambassador earlier in
his career, Senate confirmation was neither required nor sought.)  The White House
press release also stated:
In his capacity as Presidential Envoy, he will oversee Coalition reconstruction
efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and
governing structures that will guide their future.... Ambassador Bremer will
report to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and will advise the President, through
the Secretary, on policies designed to achieve American and Coalition goals for
Iraq.9
No mention was made of Lieutenant General Garner or ORHA in the press release.
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On May 11, 2003, the Washington Post reported the existence of the Coalition
Provisional Authority.10  On May 13, 2003, the Secretary of Defense designated
Ambassador Bremer as CPA Administrator.11  The first regulation issued by
Ambassador Bremer, dated May 16, 2003, identified him as Administrator of CPA.
Apparently, no official announcement was made that ORHA had been replaced, or
subsumed, by CPA.  The authority’s Inspector General stated, in his initial report to
Congress, that OHRA became CPA in May 2003.12  By June 18, Lieutenant General
Garner no longer was the head of ORHA.  A Department of Defense (DOD) news
transcript dated June 18 identified him as the former director of ORHA, and indicated
he had returned to the United States a couple of weeks earlier.13
Key CPA Personnel
 
Ambassador Bremer’s deputy is Richard Henry Jones, who is also the U.S.
Ambassador to Kuwait.  Ambassador Jones, who is on extended temporary duty
(TDY) in Iraq, was assigned to the CPA position sometime in November 2003.14
Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the United Kingdom’s Special Representative in Iraq,
is referred to, in some news articles and documents, as a deputy to the CPA
Administrator, or is identified as effectively serving as a deputy to Ambassador
Bremer.15  A news bulletin produced by the U.S. Permanent Mission to the United
Nations Office and Other International Organizations in Geneva identified Sir Jeremy
as the CPA deputy.16  Sir Jeremy’s appointment as the United Kingdom’s Special
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Representative was announced June 16, 2003, by the Prime Minister’s official
spokesman (PMOS).  He replaced John Sawers.17      
Other senior CPA officials include Rear Admiral David J. Nash, U.S. Navy
(ret.), who is director of the Program Management Office (PMO), which has
responsibility for monitoring contracts funded by the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for
FY2004 (FY2004 emergency supplemental).18  Rear Admiral Nash began his duties
in July 2003.  Major General Ronald L. Johnson, U.S. Army, is the U.S. Deputy to
the PMO, and also serves as the commander of the Gulf Region Division of the Army
Corps of Engineers.  As of February 2004, Lawrence Crandall is the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) Deputy to the PMO.19  On January 20, 2004,
Stuart W. Bowen Jr. was appointed as Inspector General by the Secretary of
Defense.20  Rear Admiral Larry L. Poe, U.S. Navy (ret.) is the Deputy Inspector
General.21
Establishment of CPA
Detailed information that explicitly and clearly identifies how the authority was
established, and by whom, is not readily available.  Instead, there are two alternative
explanations for how it was established: one version suggests that the President
established CPA; the other suggests that it was established pursuant to a United
Nations (U.N.) Security Council resolution.  While these possibilities are not
mutually exclusive, the lack of a clear, authoritative, and unambiguous statement
about how this organization was established and its status (that is, is it a federal
agency or not) leaves open many questions, particularly regarding the area of
oversight and accountability.
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National Security Presidential Directive
It has been suggested that CPA was established by an NSPD issued in May
2003.22  It is possible to infer, from the following excerpt from a report to Congress
provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), on behalf of the
President, that the President may have played a role in creating the authority.23  Of
particular interest are the statements that the CPA Administrator oversees all non-
military federal government programs and activities in Iraq, and that the President
vested the authority with executive, legislative, and judicial authority.
The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) reports to the
President through the Secretary of Defense.  He oversees, directs and coordinates
all U.S. Government (USG) programs and activities in Iraq, except those under
the command of the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). 
The CPA exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the
effective administration of Iraq, to restore conditions of security and stability, to
create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future, ... and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction
and development.  
The CPA is vested by the President with all executive, legislative and judicial
authority necessary to achieve its objectives, exercised consistent with relevant
U.N. Security Council resolutions, including [U.N. Security Council] Resolution
1483,24 and the laws and usages of war.  The CPA Administrator has primary
responsibility for exercising this authority.25
The clearest statement that the U.S. government played a part in establishing the
authority is found in a letter submitted to the President of the United Nations Security
Council by the Permanent Representatives of the United States and the United
Kingdom.  Dated two days after Ambassador Bremer was appointed by President
Bush as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq, the letter stated, in part: 
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In order to meet these objectives and obligations [disarming Iraq and providing
for the humanitarian needs of Iraqis] in the post-conflict period in Iraq, the
United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under existing
command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces,
have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government
temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the
delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.26
While this excerpt can be viewed as an acknowledgment that the United States (and
the United Kingdom) established CPA, it does not explain how the authority was
established, nor does it resolve the question of its organizational agency status.  
Government documents supporting the notion that CPA is a federal entity
(which suggests, in turn, that it was created by the President) include two presidential
memoranda.  A May 6, 2003, memorandum, as amended by a December 5, 2003,
memorandum, stated, in part:27
In accordance with Presidential direction relating to Iraq relief and
reconstruction, multiple agencies are deployed with the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) and are serving as implementing partners or executing agents
for programs and projects.  These agencies will identify funding requirements for
such programs and projects through CPA.  OMB will work with CPA to transfer
funds to the appropriate implementing agency.28
The authority’s intimate involvement in the funding process for work done by federal
government agencies in Iraq further suggests that the CPA is a federal entity.
 
Language in the FY2004 emergency supplemental also states that the CPA is
part of the federal government.  In describing how the apportionment of $18.649
billion is to be carried out, P.L. 108-106 states:
Funds appropriated under this heading [Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund]
shall be apportioned only to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (in its
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capacity as an entity of the United States Government), the Department of State,
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Treasury, the
Department of Defense, and the United States Agency for International
Development ...29
According to this excerpt, the authority is an entity of the federal government.
Nonetheless, questions remain  regarding how CPA was established, who established
it, the precise nature of its relationship to DOD (including DOD components) and
other federal entities, and whether CPA is a federal agency or some other type of
government organization.  Another unanswered question concerns the scope of
CPA’s authority when functioning in its capacity as an entity of the U.S. government.
Information provided by CPA itself indicates that its sector program
management offices (SPMOs) are part of the federal government.  (The CPA’s PMO
is supported by six SPMOs.)  In a written response to a question asked at a January
21, 2004, pre-proposal conference on contracting opportunities, the CPA stated that
“the Sector Program Management Office (SPMO) is a Government entity.”30   
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483
A second possibility is that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483
(2003) was instrumental in creating the authority, a view supported by several
documents released by the executive branch.  A solicitation issued by the Pentagon
Renovation Office, on behalf of CPA, for procuring PMO support services, stated in
the “overview”: “The CPA was enacted by the United Nations Security Council
under Resolution 1483 (2003).”31  Other government documents, including the
President’s proposed budget for FY2005 and P.L. 108-106, stated that the authority
was established pursuant to Resolution 1483.32  This statement does not necessarily
contradict the language found elsewhere in the FY2004 emergency supplemental
stating that CPA is an entity of the U.S. government, for the reason discussed above.
Nevertheless, repeated references to Resolution 1483 might be viewed by some
as implying that the resolution alone authorized or established a coalition-based
organization in Iraq, or might contribute to confusion about the organizational status
of the authority.  Relevant portions of the resolution are as follows:
The Security Council, ... Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council
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(S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and
obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying
powers under unified command (the “Authority”), ... Calls upon the Authority,
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international
law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the
restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions
in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own future.33
While recognizing the responsibility to be borne by the United States and the United
Kingdom in restoring security and stability in Iraq, this resolution does not establish,
or authorize the creation of, a specific organization to carry out this responsibility.
In the words of a former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy,
the resolution “noted and recognized, but did not establish CPA.”34
Lending support to the notion that the authority is not a federal agency, but
instead is an amorphous international organization, are statements by the Department
of the Army.  In 2003, two protests were filed with the General Accounting Office
(GAO) by Turkcell Consortium, which challenged CPA’s issuance of licenses for
mobile telecommunications services in Iraq.  GAO dismissed both protests without
having to rule on the status of CPA. 
In a letter submitted to GAO during the protest process, the U.S. Army Legal
Services Agency was unequivocal in its argument that CPA is not a federal agency:
The CPA is not a Federal agency.  Rather, as the HCA [CPA’s Head of
Contracting Activity] explains: The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is a
multi-national coalition that exercises powers of government temporarily in order
to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of
transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to
create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national
and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic
recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development.  CPA is vested with
all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war.  This
authority is exercised by the CPA Administrator.
The GAO does not have jurisdiction over this protest because CPA is not a
Federal agency.... The CPA is an organization comprised of members from a
coalition of countries.... CPA is analogous to an organization such as NATO’s
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s] Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and
Croatia.  The SFOR has its own contracting organization, the Theatre Allied
Contracting Office (TACO), which may utilize the services of United States
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military personnel.  Like the TACO, CPA is not a federal agency.  Like NATO
and SFOR, CPA is composed of an international coalition.... UN Security
Council Resolution 1483 (2003) recognizes CPA as “the Authority” to govern
Iraq and grants the CPA discretion to disburse funds in the Development Fund
for Iraq (“DFI”).35
While the CPA does employ individuals from coalition countries, there are at
least two significant differences between CPA and SFOR.  The SFOR is overseen by
a multinational organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and
it was authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1088 (1996).36  The
Security Council’s resolution explicitly authorized the establishment of SFOR (as it
also did for the precursor entity, the Implementation Force (IFOR)):
The Security Council ... authorizes the Member States ... to establish for a
planned period of 18 months a multinational stabilization force (SFOR) as the
legal successor to IFOR under unified command and control ....37  
Given that P.L. 108-106 and other government documents state that CPA is a U.S.
government entity, the Army’s response raises questions.  Arguably, the Army was
concerned that some would assume, precisely because of references to the authority
as a government entity, that CPA is a federal agency.  Another possibility is that the
Army, as the executive agent for the authority (discussed below), has assumed
responsibility for certain procurement activities and tasks, such as responding to
protests, and thus argued strongly for excluding CPA from the GAO protest process.
Legislative language might contribute to questions about the status of the
authority.  The FY2004 emergency supplemental refers to CPA as  “an entity of the
United States Government.”38  In the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2004, Section 1203(b)(1) mentions “civilian groups reporting to the Secretary [of
Defense], including” ORHA and CPA.39  Section 1203(b)(3) refers to the
“relationship of Department of Defense entities, including” ORHA and CPA.40  The
House report accompanying H.R. 1588 (P.L. 108-136), the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2004, in its comments on the section that became Section
1203, mentioned  “Department of Defense (DOD) civilian and military activities in
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41 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Authorization Act
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post-conflict Iraq.”41   Eschewing the word “agency” in favor of  “entity,” “group,”
and “activities” in legislation and congressional documents could be a reflection of
the Administration’s approach, an acknowledgment that CPA’s status is uncertain,
or a sign that Congress agrees that CPA is not an agency.
Documents produced by the Administration and the CPA do not state precisely
how this organization was established.  In the preface to the first regulation of the
CPA, dated May 16, 2003, Ambassador Bremer stated: “Pursuant to my authority as
Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CAP), relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of
war ...”42  In a December 2003 memorandum on contracting procedures for the
reconstruction of Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wrote: “The
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been established to promote the welfare
of the Iraqi people.”43  Neither statement identifies by whom, or under what authority,
CPA was established.
Selected Characteristics of CPA
The asserted lack of clarity concerning authorizing authority and establishment
of the CPA arguably extends to its status within the executive branch.  It is not clear
whether the authority is a federal agency, or can be treated as such.  What is known
is that the CPA is neither an executive department nor a government corporation.
Executive departments are identified by statute, and government corporations are
“corporation[s] owned or controlled by the Government of the United States.”44  If
the authority is a federal government entity, it may be an independent establishment,
which is defined as “an establishment in the executive branch (other than the United
States Postal Service or the Postal Rate commission) which is not an Executive
department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of
an independent establishment.”45  If it is determined that the authority is an
independent establishment, it also would be considered an executive agency.46  Other
possibilities are that CPA is a component of DOD, or that it is not a federal
government entity.  Due to its unusual status, this examination of certain of its
characteristics or features might be instructive.   
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CPA,”  Federal Contracts Report, Jan. 27, 2004, vol. 81, no. 3, p. 80.  This article stated
that the memorandum dated May 21, 2003, designated the Secretary of the Army Executive
Agent for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and that the
memorandum dated June 21, 2003, did the same for the CPA.  
CPA’s Relationship to the Department of Defense
While it is clear that, ultimately, the CPA Administrator answers to the
President, it is also clear that the Administrator reports to the Secretary of Defense
as well.47  Administratively, Ambassador Bremer and the authority fall under the
Department of the Army.  For Ambassador Bremer, this means that his salary,
Executive Level III, is paid by the Army.48  A report prepared by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), dated March 10, 2004, shows that 558 federal
government employees are detailed to CPA.  The largest contingents are from the
Department of Defense (455) and the Department of State (85).  Other agencies
contributing personnel include the Department of Transportation (2), the Department
of the Treasury (6), the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (1), OPM (1), the U.S.
Navy (2), and unknown (6).  Three detailees are ambassadors, 65 are from the
Foreign Service, 411 are identified as “federal civilian workers,” and the remaining
79 are members of the Senior Executive Service (SES).49  (CPA also employs
individuals from coalition partner countries.50)  A document available on the Army
Civilian Personnel On-Line (CPOL) website indicates that all CPA civilian
employees were realigned in 2003 to Army rolls.51        
In 2003, the Secretary of the Army was designated the executive agent for
ORHA, and, subsequently, CPA, in memoranda issued by the Deputy Secretary of
Defense.52  Neither memorandum is publicly available, but a third memorandum,
issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and dated January 14, 2004, addressed
acquisition and program support for the authority and confirmed the existence of the
previous memoranda:
Pursuant to Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code, the Secretary of the
Army is hereby assigned the authority and responsibility for the provision of
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acquisition and program management support to the CPA (Iraq and Washington,
DC) and any successor entity.  The Secretary of Defense shall determine and
prioritize the requirements to be supported pursuant to this assignment of
responsibility, as necessary. 
For purposes of this memorandum, acquisition support is intended to include the
award, administration and oversight of all contracts, grants, and other acquisition
actions in direct support of the CPA and any successor entity.  Program
management support comprises all aspects of project oversight, including
planning, scheduling and execution, as may be required by the scope of work,
directed timelines, and applicable financial management regulations.
All addressees [listed on the memorandum] shall provide support to the Secretary
of the Army, as the Secretary of the Army considers necessary, to carry out this
assignment of responsibility.  Services and supplies provided to the CPA in
furtherance of this memorandum shall be made available in accordance with
DoD Instruction 4000.19 and applicable financial management regulations.  My
memoranda of May 21, 2003, designating the Secretary of the Army as Executive
Agent for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and June
16, 2003, providing for the exercise of that responsibility in support of the CPA,
are modified accordingly.53
 
 The following description of a DOD executive agent indicates that executive
agents are assigned responsibility for DOD missions, activities, or tasks:
The Head of a DoD Component to whom the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy
Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and
authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or
administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DoD
Components. The nature and scope of the DoD Executive Agents
responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall ... be prescribed at the time of
assignment [and] ... remain in effect until the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy
Secretary of Defense revokes or suspends them.54
This definition would arguably cast CPA as a DOD component.  A broad
interpretation, though, might allow the Secretary, or Deputy Secretary, to appoint an
executive agent for a non-DOD entity or even a non-governmental entity.  DOD’s
policy governing the use of executive agents leaves open this possibility.  
4.1. The DoD Executive Agent designation shall be conferred when: 4.1.1.  No
existing means to accomplish DoD objectives exists.  4.1.2.  DoD resources need
to be focused on a specific area or areas of responsibility in order to minimize
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duplication or redundancy, or 4.1.3.  Such designation is required by law,
Executive order, or Government-wide regulation.55  
Aside from the question of whether an executive agent can be assigned to a non-
DOD or non-governmental entity, it appears that item 4.1.1, item 4.1.2, or both might
apply to the circumstances surrounding DOD and CPA.  It seems likely that item
4.1.3 does not apply, because no law, executive order, or government regulation has
been enacted, issued, or produced that requires or authorizes the Army to serve as
executive agent.  No mention is made in the Deputy Secretary’s January 14, 2003,
memorandum of which rationale applies to the authority.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz did note that Department of Defense
Instruction Number 4000.19 applies to the provision of supplies and services to the
CPA.  This document provides guidance for intragovernmental and interservice
support, which are defined as follows:
Intragovernmental support is support provided by a DoD activity to a non-DoD
Federal activity and vice versa — [it] does not include support provided to or
received from foreign governments.
Interservice support is support provided by one DoD activity to a DoD activity
of another Military Service, Defense Agency, Unified Combatant Command,
Army Reserves, Navy Reserves, Air Force Reserves, Marine Corps Reserves, Air
National Guard, or Field Activity.56
Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s memorandum did not indicate whether the authority
receives support from the Army under an interservice or an intragovernmental
agreement, which leaves unanswered the question of whether CPA is part of DOD,
or simply attached to it for the purposes of facilitating coordination with, and
receiving support from, the Department of the Army.  Nevertheless, DOD Instruction
4000.19 clarifies that a non-DOD entity may receive support from DOD.  In either
case, intragovernmental or interservice agreement, documentation is required.  
Broad areas of recurring interservice and intragovernmental support and
cooperation that do not require reimbursement should be documented with a
memorandum of agreement (MOA) or memorandum of understanding (MOU).
Recurring interservice and intragovernmental support that requires
reimbursement shall be documented on a DD [Department of Defense] Form
1144, “Support Agreement”... , or similar format that contains all the information
required on DD Form 1144.  Support that benefits a receiver without creating
additional cost to the supplier (e.g., gate guards, fire protection) may be included
on a DD Form 1144, but must be identified as non-reimbursable.  Provision of
a single item or one time service, sales of Defense Business Operations Fund
(DBOF) mission products and services, and intragovernmental sales specifically
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directed or authorized by law may be accomplished on the basis of an order or
requisition without preparing a support agreement.57
Apparently, documentation is required for the support agreement between the Army
and CPA.  If an applicable document exists and is available to the public, it might
clarify what type of agreement exists between the Army and the authority.  
CPA Office of Inspector General  
An Office of the Inspector General was established for CPA by Title III of the
FY2004 emergency supplemental.58  The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, appoints the Inspector General, and the Inspector General
reports to the CPA Administrator.59  The Inspector General’s office will cease
operations six months after the “authorities and duties” of CPA “cease to exist.”60
As of March 20, 2004, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) employed 58 persons
and had obtained the services of an auditing and accounting firm.61  
In addition to having the duties, responsibilities, and authorities outlined in the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. Appendix),62 the CPA Inspector General
(IG) is authorized to “conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and investigations
of the treatment, handling, and expenditure of appropriated funds by the Coalition
Provisional Authority in Iraq.”63  This involves, for example, monitoring obligations
and expenditures, reconstruction activities, contracts, and transfers of funds and
associated information between and among the CPA and other departments, agencies,
and entities of the federal government.64 It seems that the CPA IG is to be treated the
same as any federal agency’s OIG.  The CPA office is to coordinate with the DOD
and USAID Offices of Inspector General.65  Additionally, any federal department or
agency that is asked to provide information or assistance to the CPA OIG is to do
so.66  In his statement on the emergency supplemental, the President apparently
placed some restrictions on CPA’s OIG.  He noted that the Inspector General is to:
refrain from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or
from issuing a subpoena, which requires access to sensitive operation plans,
intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations
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by other administrative units of the Department of Defense related to national
security, or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a threat to
national security. The Secretary of Defense may make exceptions to the
foregoing direction in the public interest.67
It remains to be seen whether this restriction will have any effect on the work of the
CPA IG.
Procurement Activities
Appropriated Funds for the Reconstruction of Iraq. The Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for FY2003,68 which was the first
supplemental to provide funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, was signed on April 16,
2003, prior to the announcement that Ambassador Bremer would be the
Administration’s Presidential Envoy to Iraq.  Accordingly, there is no mention of
CPA (or ORHA) in this statute.  The $2.475 billion appropriated to the President for
the reconstruction of Iraq could be apportioned only to USAID and the Departments
of Defense, Health and Human Services (HHS), State, and the Treasury.69  
The FY2004 emergency supplemental, which was signed by the President on
November 6, 2003,  included CPA in the list of organizations to which the Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction Fund can be apportioned.70  The other five organizations in the
list were the ones included in the first supplemental.  
While the authority is eligible to receive funds for the reconstruction of Iraq, it
remains to be seen whether it will award any contracts funded by the FY2004
emergency supplemental. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s December 5, 2003,
memorandum identifying countries whose companies are eligible to compete for
contracts funded by the FY2004 emergency supplemental also stated that the
construction and services contracts funded by the supplemental “are to be awarded
by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and by the Department of Defense, on
behalf of CPA.”71  To date, solicitations for the major design/build construction
contracts have been issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army
Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), and the Naval Facilities
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Engineering Command.  Proposals were to be submitted to the office that issued the
solicitation.  Offerors72  also were required to submit copies of their proposals to the
Iraq Reconstruction Contracting Office, which is located in Alexandria, Virginia.
The Pentagon Renovation Office issued the solicitations for support for the CPA’s
PMO and sector PMOs.  Proposals were to be submitted to this office, but there was
no requirement for proposals for the program management office (PMO) and sector
program management offices (SPMOs) contracts to be submitted to the Iraq
Reconstruction Contracting Office.73  Solicitations were issued on January 6, 2004,
and, as of March 30, 17 contracts had been awarded.74
Apparently, no official explanation as to why the CPA did not issue these
solicitations has been offered.  A possible factor in the decision to decentralize the
solicitation, evaluation, and award processes might have been the scheduled
termination of the CPA.  Knowing that the CPA would terminate operations on June
30, Administration officials might have chosen the route they did in order to maintain
continuity.  Apparently, the PMO will continue to function after the CPA disbands.
In response to a question asked at the January 21, 2004, pre-proposal conference,
CPA wrote: “This issue [of who the PMO will report to after June 30] is being
studied now.  Regardless of who the CPA PMO will report to after 30 June 2004, the
CPA PMO will still be responsible for managing the Iraqi Infrastructure
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Reconstruction activities under these contracts.”75  If the PMO and SPMOs are
retained following the dissolution of CPA, alternative locations for these entities
include the Department of the Army, USAID, or the Department of State.  Another
possible reason why CPA is limited to monitoring contracts may be that government
officials ascertained that the authority does not have enough personnel, or enough
personnel with sufficient experience in the types of work to be done in Iraq, to
develop solicitations and evaluate proposals for seven major sectors, the PMO,  and
the SPMOs.  The fact that CPA needs contractor support for its PMO and SPMOs
tends to support the notion that it does not have enough resources to perform all of
the necessary procurement tasks.  A third consideration might have been the
possibility of protests, particularly the possibility that a contractor would file a protest
with the General Accounting Office (GAO) challenging the authority’s actions or
decisions concerning the award of a contract.  As discussed below, a few companies
already have filed protests with GAO concerning CPA decisions.  Perhaps the U.S.
government wanted to avoid the possibility that additional protests targeting CPA
would be filed with GAO.  (As noted below, CPA’s own contracting procedures
apply only to non-appropriated funds, and only allow for protests to be filed with
CPA officials.)
The former Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, in
writing about contracting with the authority, offered another possible explanation of
why government officials chose to have DOD components issue solicitations and
award contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq: 
The CPA is not the United States government.  Accordingly, if one enters into
a contractual relationship with the CPA, one is not entering into a contractual
relationship with the United States.  The rights and remedies available to parties
contracting with the United States will not be available in a contractual
relationship with the CPA.  The remedies available to an aggrieved contracting
party will be determined in part by the source of the money through which the
contracting party is paid.76
Government officials may have considered the question of the CPA’s organizational
status and the possibility that a contract with the authority would not be a contract
with the U.S.  government.  These considerations might have contributed to a
determination that it would not be appropriate for CPA to enter into contracts funded
by appropriated funds.  
There is some question as to whether the authority uses appropriated funds for
projects involving the reconstruction of Iraq.  In a letter it submitted to GAO on the
matter of the Turkcell Consortium protest (see below),  the United States Army Legal
Services Agency stated: “The funds CPA is using for contracts are not appropriated
funds....  Even if this action [issuing licenses for mobile telecommunications] was a
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procurement that involved the use of funds, CPA would use DFI [Development Fund
for Iraq] funds, not U.S. appropriated funds for its CPA mission.”77  This letter was
written a few weeks before the FY2004 emergency supplemental was enacted, so
possibly the Army was commenting only on conditions at the time.  If so, then the
Army’s assertion in the Turkcell Consortium bid protest might not apply to
subsequent procurement actions.  
Other evidence suggests that CPA uses appropriated funds for reconstruction
activities.  A news article that mentioned the activities of the CPA’s Program Review
Board (see below) indicates the authority spends appropriated funds:
From minutes published by the CPA’s Program Review Board, it appears that the
CPA has the power to shift monies between appropriated funds accounts and the
Development Fund of Iraq (which contains funds from both Iraqi and foreign
donated sources): “#352, Restore Iraqi Infrastructure, $711M. [million] The
Board considered the request from Task Force RIO [Restore Iraqi Oil] for
changing the funding source from appropriated funds to the Development Fund
of Iraq a previously approved request (#352, total amount approved $962M).
$251M was already provided from the Natural Resource Risk Remediation Fund
(NRRRF), an appropriated funds account.  TF RIO indicated that $711M is
outstanding and required but of that amount $466M was immediately required
to complete projects under Phase I.  The Board identified $500M as remaining
available from two appropriated accounts — the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief
Fund (IRRF) and the NRRRF and therefore the requirement was approved to
come from the appropriated funds.  A new vote may be required for the
remaining amount $211M but this was deferred.
Agenda Item #398 (‘Police equipment - Of the $90M authorized (funding source
to be either appropriated or DFI), the CPA’s Ministry of Interior team needs an
immediate disbursement of $5M.  This request is for the reprogramming of $5M
from appropriated or DFI (to be determined) to vested funds.  The request was
recommended for approval.78
The latter passage also shows that CPA might be reprogramming funds among the
various funding sources available to it (see below).
CPA Solicitations.  CPA has been issuing solicitations, which means it also
has been awarding contracts, for some time.  A continuously updated list of
solicitations is available from the CPA website.79  In early March 2004, the list
included solicitations for aerators, AK-47 assault rifles, sand bags, portable X-Ray
units, battery cells, vehicles, berets, turbine parts, a police records management
system, information technology products, agricultural equipment, satellite data
communications, and railroad equipment, parts, and services.  It is unknown what
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funds CPA uses to purchase items and services listed in its solicitations.  If CPA is
using Iraqi funds, then CPA Memorandum Number 4 applies.  Iraqi funds are defined
in this memorandum as: 
Funds under the control of the [Coalition Provisional] Authority consisting of (a)
proceeds from Iraqi state-owned property that has been vested or seized in
accordance with applicable law and made available to the CPA to assist the Iraqi
people and assist in the reconstruction of Iraq; and (b) funds in the Development
Fund for Iraq, the establishment of which is noted in Resolution 1483 (2203).
As used in this Memorandum, “Iraqi Funds” do not include funds provided
through the appropriations process of Coalition member governments (for
example, funds provided directly to the CPA by the governments of the United
States or the United Kingdom).80
If CPA is using appropriated funds, it would seem reasonable for authority personnel
to  follow the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which governs federal agency
procurement activities.  A review of three CPA solicitations showed that two (sand
bags and information technology) included numerous references to the FAR (sand
bags and information technology products).  The third solicitation, for berets,
included only one reference to the FAR.  Without additional, detailed information
about the authority’s contracting activities, it is difficult to ascertain the source of
funds and the guidance used for each procurement.  The former Administrator of the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has stated that “no rules [are] in place
for contracting by the CPA with U.S. appropriated funds.”81  In the absence of a clear
statement on the organizational status of the CPA, however, this assessment may or
may not be accurate. 
Program Review Board.  Ambassador Bremer established, through
Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation Number 3, a Program Review Board
(PRB), which reports directly to him.  The board’s  general duty is to be “responsible
for recommending expenditures of resources from the Development Fund for Iraq
and other resources identified” elsewhere in the regulation.  In developing funding
plans, the PRB recommends disbursements of appropriated funds, “Iraqi property
lawfully vested in the U.S. Treasury,” funds, cash, or other financial instruments
owned by Iraq or the (former) regime, and the Development Fund for Iraq.  A news
article asserted that the PRB “really controls only the Iraqi money.”82  However, as
noted above, a news article indicates the PRB is involved spending appropriated
funds.  The board is also responsible for proposing “principles and standards for
expending funds for the relief and recovery of Iraq in a fair, consistent and
transparent manner, through contracts or otherwise.”83  
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Program Review Board,” June 18, 2003,p. 7, available at [http://www.cpa-iraq.org/
regulations/REG3.pdf], visited Jan. 31, 2004.
84 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
85 Melanie I. Dooley, “GAO Dismisses Turkcell Protest of Iraq Telecom Licenses; Turkcell
Files New Protest after Receiving Debriefing,” Federal Contracts Report, BNA, Inc., Oct.
28, 2004, vol. 80, no. 15. p. 405.
86 Melanie I. Dooley, “GAO Dismisses Turkcell’s Second Protest of Iraq Telecom Licenses
but Leaves Door Open,” Federal Contracts Report, Nov. 18, 2003, vol. 80, no. 18, p. 507.
87 U.S. General Accounting Office, Turkcell Consortium bid protest, file B-293048.2, Nov.
12, 2003, p. 1.
88 Melanie I. Dooley, “GAO Dismisses Turkcell Protest of Iraq Telecom Licenses; Turkcell
Files New Protest after Receiving Debriefing,” Federal Contracts Report, Oct. 28, 2003,
vol. 80, no. 15, p. 405.
The board consists of a chairman, who is appointed by the CPA Administrator;
the directors of economic policy, civil affairs policy, the USAID — Iraq mission,
operations, and security affairs (all of which apparently are CPA personnel); and
authorized representatives of the commander of coalition forces, the Iraqi Ministry
of Finance, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the chairman of the Council for
International Coordination.  If the PRB takes action on any matter relating to the
disposition of appropriated funds, then the voting membership is also to include
authorized representatives of DOD, and Departments of the Treasury and State.
Additionally,  the status of the authorized representatives of the Iraqi Ministry of
Finance, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Council for International Coordination
shifts from voting to nonvoting on the disposition of appropriated funds.  Others who
may attend board meetings as nonvoting members include the CPA Comptroller and
General Counsel; Program Coordinator of the board; and authorized representatives
of OMB, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the International Monetary Fund, the
World Bank, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for
Iraq, and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board.84
Protests. Protests challenging the authority have been filed with GAO.  On
October 14, 2003, GAO received a bid protest from Turkcell Consortium, which
challenged the award of mobile telecommunications licenses in Iraq by CPA.  This
was the first protest filed that involved the authority.  The protest was dismissed
because it was based on speculation, not factual grounds, that errors occurred in the
award process.85 Turkcell Consortium filed a second protest on October 27, 2003,
which was also dismissed by  GAO because the procurement did not involve “the
provision of property or services to the federal government.”86
While CPA was the organization that awarded the contract for mobile
telecommunications licenses, GAO’s second bid protest decision identified the
cognizant agency as “Department of the Army, for the agency.”87  Reportedly, the
U.S. Army was also listed as the cognizant agency on GAO’s docket for the first
protest, and the solicitation number was listed as “unknown.”88  Citing a dismissal
request submitted by the Army, GAO stated, in its decision on the second protest:
“The Department of the Army argued that our Office lacks jurisdiction to hear this
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91 U.S. General Accounting Office, Turkcell Consortium bid protest, pp. 2-3.
92 Coalition Provisional Authority, Program Management Office, “U.S.-Iraqi-Polish Group
Receives Security Equipment Contract,” press release, Jan. 31, 2004, available at
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PORTAL], visited Mar. 8, 2004.
93 Joe Harper, “Polish Arms Company Challenges CPA Award to U.S. Firm, Alleges Bid
Evaluation Unfair,” Federal Contracts Report, Feb. 24, 2004, vol. 81, no. 7, p. 199; Melanie
I. Dooley, “Coalition Provisional Authority to Review Nour, Other Offerors to Equip Iraq
(continued...)
protest because the CPA is not a ‘federal agency.’”89  Due to the fact that both
protests were dismissed on other grounds, there was no need for GAO to resolve the
question of “whether the CPA is a federal agency for purposes of our [GAO] bid
protest jurisdiction under CICA [Competition in Contracting Act of 1984].”90  In its
second decision on this case, however, GAO explained its authority to decide bid
protests and described circumstances under which it could have jurisdiction to handle
bid protests concerning CPA:
The authority of our Office to decide bid protests is based on the Competition in
Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) ... and encompasses “a written objection by an
interested party to a solicitation or other request by a federal agency for offers
for a contract for the procurement of property or services.”  Our jurisdiction does
not turn on whether appropriated funds are involved ... or on whether the
competition requirements of CICA apply.
We note ... that even if we ultimately determine that the CPA is not a federal
agency, we may well assume jurisdiction if the challenged procurement is
conducted on the CPA’s behalf by an entity that is a federal agency (such as the
Department of the Army)....   In any event, we would also consider a request by
the CPA for our Office to consider protests outside the framework of CICA.91
CPA’s award of a contract to Nour USA to equip the Iraqi armed forces and the
Iraqi civil defense corps also has been the subject of protests.  A solicitation was
issued on November 11, 2003, and CPA (which was explicitly identified as the
contracting activity in the press release) received 19 bids.92  In a press release dated
January 31, 2004, CPA announced that it had awarded a contract for $327 million to
Nour USA. 
In mid-February, it was reported that two companies, Cemex Global Inc. and
Bumar Group, had filed separate protests, which were combined by GAO into one
protest, challenging the awarding of this contract to Nour USA.  Among their
concerns were (1) the relatively low cost of the Nour USA proposal, which was $231
million lower than the Bumar Group’s proposal; (2) the fact that Nour’s president is
A. Huda Faouki, who allegedly is a friend of Ahmad Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi
Governing Council; and (3) the belief that Nour USA, which apparently was
established in May 2003, has no experience in performing the work necessary to
fulfill the terms of the contract.93  Subsequently, four additional protests were filed
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Army,” Daily Report for Executives, Mar. 5, 2004, no. 43, p. A-24.
94 U.S. General Accounting Office, “GAO Bid Protest Docket,” available at
[http://www.gao.gov/decision/docket], visited Mar. 8, 2004.  The file numbers are B-
293676.001 through B-293676.006.  
95 Dooley,  “Coalition Provisional Authority to Review Nour, Other Offerors to Equip Iraq
Army,” p. A-24.
96 Ibid.
97 Coalition Provisional Authority, Program Management Office, “U.S. Army Terminates
Contract to Equip New Iraqi Army,” Mar. 5, 2004, available at [http://www.rebuilding-
iraq.net], visited Mar. 11, 2004.
98 Abby Bowles, “Army Materiel Command Put in Charge of Resoliciting Iraq Army
Equipment Contract Awarded to Nour,” Federal Contracts Report, Mar. 16, 2004, vol. 81,
no. 10, p. 279.
with GAO.  In each of the six protests, the Department of the Army was listed as the
cognizant agency and the solicitation number (FY5866-04-R-0001) was included.94
Reportedly, CPA indicated on March 3 that it would reevaluate all timely proposals
and make a new source selection decision.95  In light of the government’s decision
to reevaluate proposals, GAO dismissed all protests.96  In a  March 5, 2004, press
release, the CPA PMO briefly described plans for rectifying the situation, which
involves the Army, but not CPA:
Today the Army announced it will terminate its contract with Nour, USA, to
equip the New Iraqi Army.  Protests were filed subsequent to the award to Nour.
Protests are part of a transparent and fair procurement process.  As a result of an
internal review, the Army has determined there were irregularities in this specific
contract action, and took appropriate measures to assess the validity of the
protests.
The Army will conduct a complete re-solicitation; schedule release of the
solicitation is to be determined.  The Army wants to ensure the process is
transparent, fair and conduct in an expeditious manner.97
Reportedly, control of the procurement process transferred from CPA to the Army
Materiel Command.98
No explanation was provided as to why the Army will terminate the contract
when the press release that announced the award of a contract to Nour identified
CPA as the contracting activity (see above).  A possible question could be posed, for
example, why CPA, if it was the organization that awarded the contract initially,
didn’t cancel the contract.  While the Department of the Army provides support to
CPA, particularly in the area of acquisition, it is unclear how, why, or under what
circumstances, a federal agency might cancel a contract awarded by another entity
and assume responsibility for subsequent procurement activities.   
Neither CPA nor DOD has disclosed why the Department of the Army, and not
the authority, has been listed on GAO’s bid protest docket for protests involving
contracting actions apparently undertaken by CPA.  As for reconstruction contracts
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funded by the FY2004 supplemental, the fact that DOD components, such as the
Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, are the
contracting activities would seem to preclude the possibility that an offeror would file
a protest with GAO challenging CPA.  Considering the Department of the Army’s
assertion, during the protest by Turkcell Consortium, that CPA is a not an agency, it
suggests that there might be some (unknown) advantages to shielding CPA from
protests.99  Without further information about CPA’s procurement process and
organizational status, it is unclear whether any advantages exist, and, if so, what they
might be.
It is unknown whether any offerors have filed protests under the provisions of
Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 4, which, as noted above,
provides procurement rules for what may be referred to collectively as Iraqi, or non-
appropriated, funds.  The paragraph on protests states:
A contractor wishing to object to the terms of a solicitation, the termination of
a solicitation, the award of a contract, or the termination of the award of a
contract, shall present the matter to the Contracting Officer for an initial
decision.  The contractor shall state to the Contracting Officer the basis for the
protest.  If the contractor does not agree with the Contracting Officer’s initial
decision, the Contractor may appeal the initial decision to the Head of
Contracting Activity, CPA, for resolution.  The decision of the Head of
Contracting Activity, CPA, shall be the final decision in the matter.100
Not only does this provision fail to provide for any sort of external, independent
review or adjudication process (such as provided by GAO), it also omits any
requirements or procedures for CPA personnel to respond in a timely fashion, or to
provide an explanation for their decision.
Appropriated Funds for the Operating Expenses of CPA.  The
FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriates $933 million to the President for
the authority’s operating expenses.  Expenses may include “personnel costs,
transportation, supply, equipment, facilities, communications, logistics requirements,
studies, physical security, media support, promulgation and enforcement of
regulations, and other activities needed to oversee and manage the relief and
reconstruction of Iraq and the transition to democracy ....”101  These funds are “to
remain available until September 30, 2005: Provided, That the appropriation of funds
under this heading shall not be construed to limit or otherwise affect the ability of the
Department of Defense to furnish assistance and services, and any other support, to
the Coalition Provisional Authority.”102  In a memorandum dated December 5, 2003,
the President transferred these funds to the Secretary of Defense:
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The funds appropriated to the President under the heading Operating Expense of
the Coalition Provisional Authority in the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and
Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106), or in any subsequent appropriation
under this heading, are transferred to the Secretary of Defense, for an account
designated Operating Expenses of the Coalition Provisional Authority,
International Reconstruction and Other Assistance, Army.103
Information is not available to explain whether the CPA Administrator has access to
these funds, or if he relies on the Secretary of Defense for purchasing supplies and
equipment needed by CPA.
Regulatory Authority
The CPA Administrator exercises rule-making authority, which apparently is
derived from the executive authority invested in CPA by the President.  Unlike  the
heads of federal agencies, however, the Administrator apparently has not followed
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which governs informal and formal rule
making.104  For example, the authority has not announced any proposed, interim, or
final regulations in the Federal Register.  
The first regulation issued by CPA outlines the Administrator’s authority in
issuing regulations, memoranda, orders, and public notices:105 
In carrying out the authority and responsibility vested in the CPA, the
Administrator will, as necessary, issue Regulations and Orders.  Regulations
shall be those instruments that define the institutions and authorities of the CPA.
Orders are binding instructions issued by the CPA.  Regulations and Orders will
remain in force until repealed by the Administrator or superseded by legislation
issued by democratic institutions of Iraq.  Regulations and Orders issued by the
Administrator shall take precedence over all other laws and publications to the
extent such other laws and publications are inconsistent.  The Administrator may
also from time to time issue Public Notices....  The Administrator may issue
Memoranda in relation to the interpretation and application of any Regulation or
Order.106
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Enacting a regulation, order, memorandum, or public notice is accomplished by the
Administrator signing off on, or approving, the document.  Subjects of these
documents include: 
! Regulations:  Development Fund for Iraq, Program Review Board,
Governing Council of Iraq, Council for International Coordination,
Iraq Property Claims Commission, and International Donor
Assistance; 
! Orders: Penal Code, Management and Use of Iraqi Public Property,
Prohibited Media Activity, Regulation of Oil Distribution, Creation
of a New Iraqi Army, and Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison
Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors;
! Memoranda: Criminal Procedures, contract and Grant Procedures,
Implementation of De-Baathification Order No. 1, Implementation
of Weapons Control Order 3, and Appointment of Deputy Ministers;
! Public notices: Managing Financial Resources, Regarding a
Responsible Iraqi Media, Regarding the Council for International
Coordination, Regarding Public Incitement to Violence and
Disorder.107
CPA Organization Chart
An undated CPA organization chart is at Figure 1.108  While several sub-units
are missing, and it is possible that the actual organization varies from this depiction,
the chart provides insight into the authority’s chain of command and organizational
scope.  Organizational subunits and positions not shown on the chart include the
Deputy Administrator, Office of Inspector General, Program Management Office and
Sector Program Management Offices, legislative affairs staff (which is located in the
Washington, DC metropolitan area), and contracting offices (apparently, there are
two contracting offices, one each in Iraq and the Washington, DC metropolitan area).
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Statutory Reporting Requirements Concerning CPA
and the Reconstruction of Iraq
Even prior to the inception of the CPA, Congress established reporting
requirements concerning efforts to reconstruct Iraq.  Table 1 lists significant
reporting requirements concerning this effort and, in particular, CPA.
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 Table 1. Statutory Reporting Requirements Concerning the CPA and the Reconstruction of Iraq
Statute (date of enactment) Responsible Official or
Office
Recipient(s) Deadline(s) Summary of Content of
Report
P.L. 108-11, Sec. 1506(a)
(April 16, 2003)
President House and Senate
Committees on
Appropriations
Not later than 45 days after
date of enactment.
1. Description of duties,




2. A strategy for coordinating
the activities of these entities.
3. Cost estimates associated





P.L. 108-11, Sec. 1506(b)
(April 16, 2003)
President
                                                




Not later than 90 days after
date of enactment and every
90 days thereafter until Sept.
30, 2004.
1. Separate lists of
reconstruction activities that
are anticipated, or were
initiated or completed.
2. Cost estimates for
conducting proposed
activities and source of
funds.






Statute (date of enactment) Responsible Official or
Office
Recipient(s) Deadline(s) Summary of Content of
Report
P.L. 108-106, Sec. 2202(b)
(Nov. 6, 2003)                         
                                  
CPA Administrator, or
agency head








Not later than seven calendar
days before the award of a
contract under other than full
and open competition
procedures.
[Sec. 2202(b) does not
include an expiration date.] 
Justification of the use of
other than full and open
competition procedures, a
description of the scope of
the contract, a description of
the process the agency used
in identifying and soliciting
offers, the amount of the
contract, and justification and
approval documents.




Publish in the Federal
Register and post on the CPA
website.
Not later than seven days
before the date on which a
contract is entered into for
contracts awarded under
other than full and open
competition procedures.
[Sec. 2203 does not include
an expiration date.]
Amount and scope of the
contract, how contractors
were identified and solicited,
justification and approval
documents.  




Administrator and the House





Not later than January 5,
2004. Updated reports are to
be submitted to the
committees every three
months. Sec. 2207 expires on
October 1, 2007. 
1. Proposed uses of funds for
Iraq relief and reconstruction





3. Funds provided by foreign
governments and
international organizations
4. Foreign assets seized or
frozen.
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Statute (date of enactment) Responsible Official or
Office
Recipient(s) Deadline(s) Summary of Content of
Report
P.L. 108-106, Sec. 2215(a)
(Nov. 6, 2003)
CPA Administrator 1. House and Senate
Committees on
Appropriations
2. Post on CPA’s website
Initial report due within 30
days after date of enactment. 
Subsequent reports due on a
monthly basis until
September 30, 2006.
Iraqi oil production, oil
revenues, and uses of oil
revenues.
P.L. 108-106, Sec. 3001(i)(1)
and (4), (j)
(Nov. 6, 2003)








3. Post on CPA website
4. CPA Administrator
Not later than March 30,
2004, and every calendar
quarter thereafter.
[Apparently, this requirement
will continue until OIG
expires, which will happen
six months after CPA is
dissolved. (Sec. 3001(o).)]
A detailed statement of all
obligations, expenditures,
and revenues associated with
reconstruction and
rehabilitation activities in
Iraq (including the operating
expenses of CPA and a
discussion of how CPA used
other than full and open
competition procedures).
P.L. 108-106, Sec. 3001(i)(3)
and (4), (j)
(Nov. 6, 2003)








3. Post on CPA website
4. CPA Administrator
Not later than June 30, 2004,
and semiannually thereafter.
[Apparently, this requirement
will continue until OIG
expires, which will happen
six months after CPA is
dissolved. (Sec. 3001(o).)]
Summary of the activities of
the OIG in the previous six
months (for example, 
significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies, and OIG’s
recommendations for
corrective action).
P.L. 108-136, Sec.  1203
(Nov. 24, 2003)







Statute (date of enactment) Responsible Official or
Office




undertaken in Iraq by DOD
officials and those civilians
reporting to the secretary. A
A required element is a
discussion of the evolution of
the organizational structure
of the civilian groups
(ORHA and CPA) reporting
to the Secretary.  
P.L. 108-199, Sec. 599C
(Nov. 25, 2003)
OPM House and Senate
Committees on
Appropriations
Initial report  due  February
1, 2004.  Subsequent reports
due every quarter until May
2005.
Number of detailees, by
agency, that are detailed to
CPA.
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109 In a briefing on contracting programs in Iraq, Lawrence Di Rita, Acting Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs, stated: “We’re in a war, we’re in a global war on terror.  We
have — many of the restrictions on how money is appropriated and spent are based on rules
and statutes that have developed over a course of time that was not a period of war.  So
we’ve got a certain disconnect between the need to spend money quickly now, and we’ve
got certain funds available to do that — the CERP [Commanders Emergency Response
Program] is a pot of money that’s got fewer restrictions, relatively speaking, attached to it.
It is certainly understandable that a military commander who just knows if he had $10
million he can address some issues, isn’t going to necessarily be the one who’s patient
enough to sort through all the peacetime restrictions on the use of funds.  That’s somebody
else’s job; people are doing that.  These restriction are real, they were put in place for a very
good reason.  But they’re restrictions that bear some scrutiny now that we’re trying to
address a problem that is real time; and it’s not only a real-time problem, it’s a real-time
problem where people are being killed....  But I can tell you that the people who are
responsible, who have that more — who have that broader view of how this money is
allocated and what those restrictions are, are working through the problem in a very
aggressive way — Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, General Sanchez....  We have a
lot of restrictions on the way some money can be spent, fewer restrictions on the way other
money can be spent, and we’re trying our best to kind of make those determinations all the
time.” (Rear Admiral David J. Nash (ret.), Director, CPA Program Management Office, and
Lawrence Di Rita, Acting Secretary Defense of Public Affairs, “Briefing on Contracting
Programs,” news transcript, Mar. 10, 2004, available at [http://www.defenselink.mil/
transcripts/2004], visited Mar. 11, 2004.)
Policy Issues
Discussion of CPA 
While a letter exists that states that the United States, and the United Kingdom,
created the authority, and there are several documents that suggest that CPA is a U.S.
government entity, the status of this organization remains open to question.  No
explicit, unambiguous, and authoritative statement has been provided that declares
how the authority was established, under what authority, and by whom.  Instead, the
Army maintains, for example, that the CPA is not a federal agency, but an
international coalition similar to a NATO-based organization, SFOR.  Other
executive branch documents state, or imply, that U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483 was instrumental in creating CPA.        
Perhaps this ambiguity allows the authority to perform multiple roles, each with
its own chain of command, stakeholders or constituents, funding, and accountability
policies and mechanisms.  A statement in the FY2004 emergency supplemental —
“in its [CPA] capacity as an entity of the United State government” — suggests that
U.S. government entity is only one of CPA’s roles.  Other roles might include
temporarily aiding in the governing of Iraq and serving as part of a coalition.
Possibly, the mix of arrangements allows CPA to operate with greater discretion and
more authority, and have access to more resources than if it was solely a federal
agency, or an arm of the United Nations.109  CPA personnel also might be able to
work more efficiently and effectively under this mix.  By operating under more than
one set of laws, regulations, and policies, CPA  possibly could expand the scope and
reach of the organization’s authority beyond what it would be otherwise. For
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example, the CPA Administrator drafted the regulations, orders, memoranda, and
public notices that apply to Iraq; and the Program Review Board has jurisdiction over
four funding sources, including appropriated funds.  An advantage of having the CPA
treated as part of the Department of Defense is that the chain of command runs
through the executive branch, which would not occur if CPA were purely an
international organization or coalition.  
Billing itself as an international coalition, while eschewing the label “federal
agency,” might be construed as an effort to make the organization more palatable, at
least symbolically, to Iraqis and others.  For example, the CPA website address ends
“.com” and the PMO website ends “.net.”  United States government website
addresses typically end “.gov.”  Furthermore, the Iraqi flag is the only flag that
appears on the two websites.  No flags from coalition countries are displayed.
  
Potential drawbacks of this arrangement are that the lines of authority and
accountability could become tangled, or even obscured.  CPA personnel possibly
could find it difficult to understand and delineate clearly — on a daily basis — the
organization’s different roles and associated funds, laws, and rules. Personnel might
be hampered by this tangle of resources, laws, and documents, and could find
themselves engaging in questionable, if not unethical or criminal, activities. This
scenario also could prove challenging for organizations that are attempting to monitor
CPA and its activities.  When the authority makes a decision or expends funds, it
might not be clear to external parties under what authority it is acting.  Without
transparency, the CPA might give the appearance of shifting funds, personnel, and
tasks among different roles.  Further compounding the problem, oversight initiatives
might be met with the response that the activity in question was carried out under an
authority over which the oversight body — Congress — has no jurisdiction.  
While greater transparency possibly could help to clarify CPA’s role(s),
knowing how CPA was established and under what authority would go a long way
in helping to determine whether it is a federal agency, the scope of its authority, and
the forms, types, and mechanisms of accountability to which it is subject.  These
questions will remain relevant even after CPA’s scheduled dissolution on June 30,
2004, for questions may remain about what it did, how it spent money, and what it
accomplished. While information gleaned from CPA personnel would be potentially
useful in the near future, it also could be useful in the long-term in informing any
future efforts to provide aid to countries faced with similar problems. 
Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act 
of 2004 (S. 2127)
An approach that is different from the one taken by the Administration
concerning Iraq may be found in S. 2127, which, as discussed below, would establish
an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the Department of
State.  S. 2127 was introduced by Senator Richard Lugar, for himself and Senator
Joseph Biden, on February 25, 2004, and was referred to the Senate Committee on
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Foreign Relations.110  On March 18, the bill was reported, without amendment, and
placed on the Senate legislative calendar.  A companion bill, H.R. 3996, was
introduced by Congressman Adam B. Schiff, for himself and six other Members, on
March 18, 2004, and was referred to the House Committee on International Relations
on the same day.
In the report that accompanied S. 2127, the committee offered some insight into
the rationale for this legislation:
In the Balkans, Africa, the Caribbean, Afghanistan, and now in Iraq, the U.S.
Government has cobbled together plans, people and resources in an ad hoc
fashion, usually with the Defense Department in the lead.  Subsequent to U.S.
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cognizant of the difficulties of
the ongoing transitions in those two nations, the committee recognized the need
for structural change within the U.S. Government to better plan and carry out the
civilian component of stabilization and reconstruction activities ....  The
committee envisions the Secretary of State leading the organizational effort in
full consultation with the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, an agency whose technical skills and operational experience are
invaluable both in Washington and in the field ....  This bill recognizes that the
international community can play a vital role in this effort.  One important
function of the new State Department office created by the bill is to develop a
clear vision of the comparative advantages, the objectives and strategies, and the
corresponding capabilities of all possible international contributors to
stabilization and reconstruction missions.  The committee recognizes the specific
skills that the United Nations and its specialized agencies, as well as non-
governmental organizations, and other individual nations can bring to conflict
and post-conflict situations.111
Chief among the provisions of this bill is Section 6, Office of International
Stabilization and Reconstruction.  Section 6 would authorize the Secretary of State
to establish an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the
Department of State.  The head of this office (“coordinator”) would be appointed by
the President and confirmed by the Senate, report to the Secretary, and  have the rank
and status of Ambassador-at-Large.  The head of the Office of International
Stabilization and Reconstruction would be responsible for, among other things,
monitoring unstable situations around the world, planning for reconstruction crises,
coordinating with relevant executive agencies to develop interagency contingency
plans, and coordinating with appropriate components of the United Nations.112  An
established office possibly would yield benefits that an ad hoc arrangement would
not, such as continuity of operations, an experienced staff, and institutional memory.
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The President would, moreover, have the flexibility to choose someone other than the
coordinator (or his or her office) to lead reconstruction efforts.113  
Other provisions would authorize the President to provide assistance to respond
to a crisis, the establishment of a response readiness corps, and the creation of a
curriculum on stabilization and reconstruction.114
It appears that this legislation, if enacted, possibly could address some of the
issues that have been raised concerning CPA.  Implementation of this bill arguably
could promote the development and maintenance of a permanent civilian institutional
capacity for preparing for, and responding to, international crises. S. 2127 is explicit
in stating where the proposed office would be located and to whom the office head
would report.  This information could aid in clarifying the chain of command for the
office and the extent of its authority.  
Conclusion
The Coalition Provisional Authority represents a multinational effort to rebuild
Iraq,  restore stability, and aid in establishing an interim Iraqi government.  While its
mission statement is fairly clear, other aspects of the authority are more obscure,
particularly how it was established, under what authority, and by whom (within the
U.S. government).  Available information about the authority found in materials
produced by the Administration alternatively: (1) deny that it is a federal agency; (2)
state that it is a U.S. government entity; (3) suggest that it was enacted under United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1483; (4) refer to it, and OHRA, as “civilian
groups ... reporting to the Secretary [of Defense]”;115 and (5) state that it was created
by the United States and United Kingdom.  Without a clear, unambiguous statement
that declares the CPA’s organizational status and clarifies its relationship with DOD
and other federal agencies, various questions may be left unanswered, including
whether, and to what extent, CPA might be held accountable for its programs,
activities, decisions, and expenditures.   
